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With the appearance of volume 3 in 1998, Wolfhart Pannenberg's 
Systematic Theology is now available to English readers in its entirety-all 
sixteen hundred pages of it. The multivolume project is a fitting capstone 
to a brilliant theological career. Theologians variously draw praise for 
originality, for careful arguments, for sweeping theological vision, and for 
extensive scholarship. However, Pannenberg's work is impressive on all 
counts. Since he first attracted international attention nearly forty years 
ago with his revisionary-many thought revolutionary-interpretation of 
Christian eschatology, Pannenberg has steaddy worked his way across a 
wide front of theological issues, moving his thought forward, as well as 
outward, in the process. The culminating work of his career is much more 
than a summary of what he has done before. 
Indeed, Pannenberg's offering is arguably the most impressive systematic 
theology to emerge during the last quarter century. Other influential 
theologians, such as Jiirgen Moltmann and Eberhard Jungel, have produced 
noteworthy studies on various doctrinal themes, but no one in Pannenberg's 
league has produced a full-fledged system, an integrated presentation that 
encompasses the entire scope of Christian faith. Moreover, Pannenberg's 
endeavor succeeds by every relevant standard of theological importance. It is 
biblically based, historically informed, ecclesiastically sensitive, philosophically 
sophisticated, and contemporary and constructive. Like the best of what Paul 
Tillich calls "apologetic theology," Pannenberg's work takes seriously the task 
of addressing the modern world. In fact, that is one of the distinguishing themes 
of his work: theology must demonstrate the credibility of its claims. 
In spite of the title, Pannenberg does much more than assemble the 
various themes and issues that Christian theology must face. He brings to 
them his own unifying vision. Thus, what we have in this work is not merely 
systematic, but constructive, theology at its best. It reflects on the whole range 
of Christian beliefs from the perspective of a powerful, original mind. 
There is no way a single article can do justice to Pannenberg's sweeping 
project, of course. Immense in scope and meticulously constructed, ths work 
will no doubt generate doctoral dissertations and techcal discussions for years 
to come, and eventually all its positions will receive careful analysis. Our 
objective here is to convey a general feel for Pannenberg's overall project, a 
general sense of the basic dynamic that moves through the various parts of lus 
system. We will fim sketch some of the ideas that pervade Pannenberg's work, 
then describe one or two of the salient points in his treatment of each major 
doctrine, and fmally step back and critique his overall proposal, noting one or 
two of its problematic aspects. 
Pervasive Themes in  Pannenbwg 
Three pervasive themes in Pannenberg's thought are eschatology, 
Trinity, and truth. What would happen if we started our theology at the 
end instead of the beginning? If we turned the traditional sequence of 
doctrines upside down and made eschatology basic to everything else? As 
a recent book on Pannenberg indicates, Beginning with the End, that is 
exactly what he does in his Systematic Theology. He interprets the entire 
range of Christian belief as an outworking of the basic conviction that 
history will end in the full and final establishment of God's reign. "The 
eschatological future of God in the coming of his kingdom is the 
standpoint from which to understand the world as a whole" (2:146). So, 
even though he takes up the major doctrines in more or less their 
traditional order, starting with God and concluding with last things, the 
concept of a coming consummation permeates the entire scheme. It affects 
his understanding of revelation, God, humanity, salvation, and church. 
Perhaps most important, it affects his understanding of truth. 
For Pannenberg, there is a close connection between eschatology and 
truth, because events, like words, acquire meaning only in context. When 
someone utters a word, we don't know precisely what the word means 
until we hear the entire sentence. We need the whole context in order to 
understand each part. Similarly, we need to see the entire course of 
history in order to understand the meaning of each event.' This is why 
'This illustration is particularly apt of the German language, which in certain 
constructions places the verb or an important part of the verb at the end of the sentence. 
eschatology is basic to Christian theology. The final future makes history 
a totality, so it determines the meaning of all that comes before. 
Pannenberg's theological system is also marked by a concern for 
truth, in particular the truth about God. And this distinguishes him from 
many other theologians today. For neo-orthodoxy and the more recent 
"postliberal," "confessional," or "nonfoundationalist" approaches to 
Christian thought, truth is the presupposition of theology. The contents 
of Christian theology are more or less self-authenticating, and the 
theologian's task is to explicate or bear witness to them. But for 
Pannenberg, Christian claims must be established, not merely assumed. 
Evidence and argument play an important role in theology. 
Pannenberg joins a long tradition of theologians in seeking to 
establish the truth of Christianity, but there is nothing traditional in the 
way he goes about it. For one thing, assessing the truth of Christian 
claims is not a separate discipline for him. Unlike older natural theologies 
or more recent theological "prolegomena," Pannenberg discusses the truth 
of revelation throughout his theological program. Moreover, he not only 
develops arguments by appealing to our common human experience, as 
does traditional natural theology; he also turns to the contents of faith and 
develops rather striking arguments from them. In the case of God, for 
example, he appeals to religious history, not the classical arguments for 
God's existence. In the case of Christology, he argues for the historicity 
of Jesus' resurrection. And in the case of eschatology, he argues for the 
rationality of a general resurrection of the dead. 
Another important theme in Pannenberg's system is the Trinity. 
Along with a number of contemporary theologians, Pannenberg finds a 
rich resource for Christian thought in the church's ancient reflections on 
God as Father, Son, and Spirit. He, too, sees salvation history as a 
disclosure of God's eternal reality and views God's inner life as the 
ultimate context for all the major concerns of Christian faith-creation, 
salvation, and the final consummation. Love leads God to create a finite 
reality, which he loves and cares for, to redeem this world and restore it 
to the divine life. So, there is an intimate relation between God's saving 
- 
actions and the divine essence. God's great love propels him into the 
world, so to speak, and he seeks to bring the world into his embrace. 
These are not the only themes that concern Pannenberg. Nor does he 
strive to weave them into a tight logical fabric. He doesn't deduce all his 
conclusions from basic premises, or tie all his doctrinal points into a tidy 
bundle. Different topics require different methods of inquiry, he argues. 
Nevertheless, he does relate his central concerns to each other. Both truth 
and Trinity have an eschatological character. 
Truth and eschatology are closely related, because only with the fina 
consummation will the full meaning of history appea2 and the truth about 
God, humanity and creation be fully manifest. Short of the consummation, 
our grasp of these realities is provisional, not just becaw our understanding 
is limited, but also because their identity is not fixed until history has run its 
full course. "Creation will be complete," Pannenberg asserts, "only with the 
eschatological consummation of the world" (2:wi). 
God's divinity is an eschatological reality, too, for God's lordship, or 
reign, is fully established only with the final consummation. To put it 
starkly, only then is God fully God! Because the drama of God's inner life 
unfolds in creaturely history, God's life becomes complete only when 
history reaches its conclusion. Love takes God into the world and finds 
fulfdlment when all creation enters its embrace. With these "Pannenbergian" 
themes in mind, let us follow his path through the major Christian 
doctrines, noting some highlights along the way. 
Volume I: Theology and God 
Pannenberg's discussion of the truth of Christian faith serves as a 
counterpart to the natural theologies or theistic arguments that abound in 
traditional theological tomes. While he agrees with neo-orthodox thinkers that 
al l  knowledge of God depends on revelation: he also insists, with liberal or 
Enlightenment thinkers, that the truth of revelation must be argued for, not 
merely asserted. The experience of revelation is not self-authenticating. It 
requires confirmation from the sphere of our larger experience. To achieve 
this, Pannenberg attempts to show that revelation and God are inextricably 
linked and that we can argue for God's reality on the basis of this connection. 
Pannenberg reverses the conventional understanding of religion and God. 
For many in the modern age, religion is a purely anthropological 
phenomenon, a function of human nature, and God is merely a particular 
manifestation of religion. But for Pannenberg, religion doesn't produce God; 
God produces religion. If we look at the actual content of religion-not to an 
abstraction like "human religiousness"-we see that concrete religions have an 
intentional quality; they point to the divine which evokes them. Therefore, 
we cannot give religion a purely anthropological basis. 
A close inspection of "religion" leads to the same conclusion. The idea 
that religion is a function of human experience presupposes that human 
nature is a unity. And the idea of human unity derives from a sense of divine 
'This does not mean that the end is a complete mystery until it occurs. Because God's 
saving activity contains "proleptic" manifestations of the end of history, we can develop an 
understanding of the end as it "arrives" ahead of time in the great events of salvation history. 
'"God can be known," he asserts, "only if he gives himself to be known" (1:189). 
unity. But this is the culmination of God's self-revelation in human history, 
particularly the history of Israel. Thus, the history of religion is a 
manifestation of the unity of deity, not the other way around (1:149-150). 
The crucial question, of course, is whether concrete religions establish the 
truth of God. And the answer, says Pannenberg, lies in their capacity to 
interpret human experience. "The gods of the religions must show in their 
experience of the world that they are the powers which they claim to be" 
(1: 161). If God is "the all-determining reality," our experience will confirm it. 
And if it doesn't, then God will seem to be no more than a human concept, 
"a purely subjective human idea" (1: 159). Monotheism overcame its rivals 
because it provided a superior interpretation of human experience. With it 
came the conviction that the God of Israel is the God of all humanity, the 
world's ultimate sovereign, the one "all-determining reality. " Therefore, 
theism is the culmination of a religious quest, not a philosophical one. 
Pannenberg's doctrine of God also underscores the priority of revelation. 
According to a familiar theological tradition, the unity of God is accessible to 
rational inquiry, while the Trinity is hidden. But for Pannenberg, this is 
backwards. The distinctions of Father, Son, and Spirit are disclosed in the 
event of revelation; "What is hidden is the unity of the divine essence in these 
distinctions" (1:341). Consequently, he discusses the Trinity before the divine 
unity. This approach echoes a theme found in many contemporary works on 
the Trinity-the idea that "the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity." 
And it reflew the concern that our understanding of God should come 
primarily from God's self-revelation, not from human speculation. 
Like others who have commented on the Trinity in recent years, 
Pannenberg bemoans the tendency to detach God's essence from h s  historical 
actions. When the thought of the eternal and essential Trinity "broke loose 
from its historical moorings," people began to think of God as "untouched by 
the course of history and as inaccessible to all creaturel~ knowledge." 
Accordingly, he   refers the patristic doctrine, which begins with the 
revelation of the Father in the Son through the witness of the Spirit, and only 
then moves on to the doctrine of the eternal consubstantiality of Father, Son, 
and Spirit in the unity of God's eternal essence (1:332). 
For Pannenberg, then, God's actions in salvation history define the divine 
essence, revealing that God's inner reality consists of "concrete life relations" 
(1335,323). Consequently, the Trinity is not derived from God's essence; the 
Trinity is God's essence. We never get behind the Trinity to something more 
basic or original. God's fundamental reality is Father, Son, and Spirit. It is not 
a single divine essence. Nor is it a single divine person. Consequently, we 
should not apply the notion of derivation to the persons of the Trinity. The 
Father is not the source or origin of the Son and the Spirit. The persons of the 
Trinity are united to each other, not by derivation, but by self-distinaion. 
This view of divine relations is basic to the idea that love is the defdpg 
quality of God, for love is supremely relational. So, if God is truly love, there 
must be relations in the very depths of the divine being. 
The love that defmes God's inner reality comes to expression in a l l  God's 
relations to the world, and this has profound implications for his creative 
activity. It means that God's decision to create is entirely kee, and this means 
that the world he creates is entirely contingent. It exists only because God 
chose to create it. As an expression of the world's radical contingency, 
Pannenberg defends the venerable concept of creatio ex nihilo-a move that 
sets him apart from many contemporary thinkers. (He is particularly critical 
of process philosophers, for whom God creates by interacting with another 
~rinciple in the universe that is just as basic as he is3 
But if love means that God is free to create or not, it also means that God 
is irreversibly committed to the world he bringsinto existence. In fact, he 
loves the world so much that his very life is bound up with what he has made 
(1:447). This trinitarian concept of God provides the basis for Pannenbergls 
entire theological project. Its overarching objective is to show that the love of 
God comes to expression in creating a f ~ t e  world and ultimately 
incorporating it "into the unity of the trinitarian life" (3:646).5 
Volume 2: Creation and Incarnation 
The trinitarian view of God means that God's dealings with creation not 
only portray his inner relations; they bring these relations to fulfillment. This 
is particularly vivid in the incarnation, the central act in salvation history. The 
Son creates a world distinct from God out of his own eternal and free self- 
distinction from the Father (2:63; cf. 30,58). Then he fulfiis the working of the 
Logos throughout the world by entering creation in human form. The 
incarnation, therefore, is "simply the theologically highest instance of 
creationn(2:114). Again, through the Spirit the Son brings the creatures into his 
own fellowship with the Father (2:32). 
What is true of creation generally is doubly true of human beings, the most 
highly developed of living creatures. Their appearance brings to light the 
meaning of all creaturely reality (2: 133,135). The incarnation, in turn, fulfiis the 
purpose of their existence, making possible their ultimate incorporation within 
'Although he rejects this fundamental aspect of process thought in favor of the more 
traditional account, Pannenberg approves of the process notion that God works on his 
creatures by persuasion rat+ than force (2:15-16). 
'Cf. 2:75, where he states that the goal of creation is "the participation of creatures in 
the trinitarian fellowship of the Son with the Father." 
the fellowship of God's own being.6 Jesus' relation to the Father thus fulfrlls the 
destiny of creation generally, and of human beings in particular (2: 115). 
The incarnation also sheds light on two other aspects of Christian 
anthropology, namely, personness and destiny. Jesus' message that God 
reaches out with eternal love to each of his creatures, especially those who 
have gone astray, led to the idea that each human life in its individual 
uniqueness has infinite worth to God. Later Christian thinkers related this idea 
to the unity of Jesus with the divine Logos. As Jesus, the eternal Son, is a 
"person" in relation to the Father, so "all individuals are persons in virtue of 
the relation to God, which is the basis of their whole existence" (2: 199-200). 
As for human destiny, the Son of God came in the flesh in order to 
overcome sin and death (2:202), so the incarnation lies behind each 
person's destiny of fellowship with God. The incarnation also enables us 
to share in the 'image of God.' According to Paul, the true image of God 
appeared in Jesus Christ-indeed, only in Jesus with full clarity-and his 
salvation enables us to participate in it (2:208,216). So, Jesus Christ brings 
to fulfillment our destiny as creatures (2210). 
Pannenberg's anthropology has a decidedly eschatological cast. Human 
destiny, he insists, was not fulfilled at the beginning of human history, but 
"will come only as the goal and consummation of this history" (23223). The 
same is true of creation as a whole: we must view it from the end. "The 
eschatological future of God in the coming of his kingdom is the standpoint 
from which to understand the world as a wholen (2:146). 
It is also the only standpoint for responding to the problem of evil. Says 
Pannenberg, "There is no theodicy without eschatologyn (2:173). It is a 
mistake to try to absolve God of responsibility for evil, he says. The attempt 
cannot succeed, and besides, the cross shows that God accepted responsibility 
for the world he created (2:166). Because he foresees and permits evil, 
responsibility for its entrance into the world inevitably falls on God. He 
risked sin and evil when he created human beings who were free. The 
important thmg is that God cares for his creation and eventually overcomes 
its suffering. And this, after all, is what innocent and disproportionate 
suffering cries out for-"a real overcoming of eviln (2:164). 
Human sin has its origin in our situation as finite beings who are 
"open to the world' and destined for fellowship with God. We achieve 
this destiny when we accept our status as creatures and distinguish God 
from everything finite, including ourselves. As finite beings, however, we 
are naturally self-assertive; we arrogate to ourselves a share of the divine 
life. Only by accepting our finitude as God-given do we attain to 
&In the incarnation of the Son, creaturely existence in its distinction from God, but 
also in its destiny of fellowship with him, comes to fulfiient" (223 1). 
fellowship with God. In other words, we must be fashioned into the 
image of the Son, who accepted self-distinction from the Father (2:23O-3 1). 
Pannenberg's position on death is somewhat ambiguous. According to 
the Bible, he observes, death is a consequence of sin. It is not a penalty 
imposed from without, but the natural result of breaking our relationship 
with God, the source of life (2:270). At the same time, however, he says that 
death is intrinsic to human finitude, since al l  physical organisms come to an 
end. For many contemporary theologians, this connection severs the link 
between death and sin, and only our consciousness of sin leads us to see death 
as punishment (2:267-268). But Pannenberg rejects the idea that death is a 
natural consequence of finitude. Because Christian hope expects a life without 
death (ICor 15:52ff), it is clear that finitude does not always have to include 
mortality. "Only of existence in time," he says enigmatically, "is it true that 
the finitude of life and mortality go together" (2:272). 
Pannenberg's soteriology includes some of the most familiar aspects of his 
work-his Christology from below and his insistence on the historicity of 
Jesus and the reality of the resurrection.' For him, who Jesus was is basic to 
what Jesus did.* Pannenberg's Christology also provides a good example of his 
theological method, for he often arrives at somewhat traditional conclusions 
by strikingly contemporary arguments. In this case, he begins where modern 
approaches to Christology do, with the history of Jesus. Yet he concludes 
with the "high Christology" of the Fathers that Jesus is both divine and 
human. There is an inner continuity, he insists, between the message of the 
historical Jesus and the apostolic preaching of Christ, and Jesus' resurrection 
is the necessary connection between the two. Indeed, the resurrection is 
utterly basic to Jesus' identity. "Only by his resurrection from the dead did 
the crucified attain to the dignity of the Kyrios (Phil. 2:9-11). Only thus was 
he appointed the Son of God in power @om. 1:4)" (2:283). "Only Easter 
determines what the meaning was of the pre-Easter history of Jesus and who 
he was in his relation to G o d  (2:345). It confirms that Jesus was the Son of 
God as far back as the beginning of his earthly existence (2:365-366). 
Pannenberg's position on Jesus' resurrection is one of the best-known 
aspects of his th~ught .~  He insists, as he has throughout his career, that the 
resurrection was a historical, factual event (2:285). Otherwise, he argues, there 
71t was Pannenberg's position on the resurrection that catapulted him to international 
prominence years ago while he was still in his thirties. See, for example, his article, "Did Jesus 
Really Rise From the Dead," in Didlog 4 (1965):128-135. 
'Pannenberg devotes two chapters to the person of Christ and one to Christ's work. 
Vannenberg's discussion here recapindates many of the points made in his earher work, 
Jesus-Godand*, trans. Lewis L. W i h  and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Wesuninster Press, 
1968). 
is no way to acmunt for the history of the church's confession of Christ. He 
appeals to the traditions of the resurrection appearances and the empty tomb, 
and he connects Jesus' resurrection to the idea of a general resurrection of the 
dead. Without the background of a general resurrection, he maintains, the 
claim that Jesus has risen from the dead cannot make sense. Conversely, Jesus' 
own resurrection supports belief in a general resurrection of the dead. Thus, 
Jesus' resurrection points to the universal transformation of humanity and the 
world that is still to come (2:531). 
As Pannenberg understands the Trinity, we have seen, the events of 
salvation history mirror, exprey and fulfrll the inner life of God. Accordingly, 
the incarnation is basic to every aspect of Christian faith, particularly our 
understanding of humanity and divinity. The incarnation shows that there is a 
basic compatibility between human existence and the divine. The Son's self- 
distinction from the Father, which is central to the divine life, comes to 
expression in all creation, but particularly in human beings. So, "human nature 
as such is ordained for the incarnation of the eternal Son in it," and "the self- 
distinction of the Son from the Father can take shape in us" (238186). 
The Son's role in the Trinity reaches its fullest expression in the supreme 
moment of salvation history. "The remoteness from God on the cross," 
Pannenberg asserts, "was the climax of his selfdistiiction from the Father." 
Jesus' obedience unto death thus fulfded the mission God gave the eternal Son. 
Contrary to widespread misunderstanding Jesus did not abandon his divine 
essence as the Son of God when he "emptied himself." Instead, he actively 
expressed it. "Hence the end of his earthly path in obedience to the Father is the 
revelation of his deity." As the great hymn of Phil 2 indicates, the path of Jesus 
to the cross was that of the preexistent Son of God (2:375,377). 
The event that most fully expresses God's inner nature also reveals the kind 
of sovereignty God exercises. Christ brings God's kingdom, not by gaining 
political power over the nations, but by his death. God establishes his rule in the 
world "without oppression and with respect for the independence of creatures" 
(2:394). 
The incarnation also fulfills the reciprocal movement in the history 
of salvation. It not only brings to expression God's inner reality; it also 
brings human beings, and ultimately all creation, into the inner life of 
God. Says Pannenberg, "By the incarnation of the Son, sinners . . . are 
brought into the trinitarian fellowship of God, and thus made participants 
in eternal life" (2:390).1° His soteriology thus embraces the ancient idea 
that the goal of salvation is to divinize humanity. 
'The incarnation "brings creation into the trinitarian fellowship" (2:389). 
Volume 3: Church and Consummation 
Three long chapters on the church form the bulk of vol. 3. One of the most 
interesting f e a ~ e s  of his ecdgiology is the way Pannenberg treats individual 
salvation. The longest chapter of his Systematic Theology-338 pages!-is entitled 
"The Messianic Community and Individuals." By incorporating the discussion 
of individual experience of salvation within the framework of the church, he 
counteracts the widespread impression that salvation is primarily an individual, 
if not private, experience, and church membership is secondary if not 
incidental." Since both are essential, he argues, it is a mistake to think either that 
church participation precedes individual salvation or that the church is somehow 
secondary or supplementary to an individual's faith (3:9f). 
Nevertheless, Pannenberg gives the individual's experience priority. Jesus 
addressed individuals when he proclaimed the imminent rule of God, he 
observes, and the church directs its missionary message and liturgical 
proclamation primarily to individuals (3:98). Moreover, confession and 
baptism are basic to church fellowship, and these are the actions of an 
individual. On the other hand, Pannenberg rejects the "individualistic Jesus- 
piety" that characterizes the attitudes of a gpod many Christians (3:125-126). 
Jesus surrounded himself with disciples during his earthly life, and after Easter 
belonging to Jesus was mediated by the fellowship of his church (3:125). 
Pannenberg's discussion of salvation gives a prominent place to trinitarian 
themes, especially the work of the Holy Spirit. The life-giving function of the 
Spirit consummates God's work in both creation and salvation (3:l-2). And, 
the Spirit plays an important role in the Gospel accounts of Jesus' life. The 
Father gives the Holy Spirit to the Son, who gives the Spirit back to the 
Father at his death (3:ll).  The most vivid manifestation of the Spirit is Jesus' 
resurrection, but it also fded his pre-Easter life (3:6). 
Just as it affects the relation of the Son and the Father, the incarnation 
reflects and modifies the relation between Son and Spirit in eternity. The Son 
receives the Spirit from the Father in eternity, but in the incarnation the Holy 
Spirit comes in the form of a gft. Both the life- and &-giving work of the 
Spirit are evident in the recipients of salvation, too. Christ's resurrection 
signifies to believers their own resurrection from the dead, and God's Spirit 
provides lasting endowments to the church (39 ,  11). 
The Spirit's most important soteriological work is to connect 
believers with the Son and thus incorporate them in the inner life of God. 
"At times, however, Pannenberg's way of phrasing the relation between salvation and 
church gives priority to the individual's experience. In the foreword to volume 3, for example, 
he places the focus of the discussion "on individual participation in salvation, with the church 
and sacraments simply as signs of its future consummation." "It is only in the immediacy of the 
personal relation to God," he states, "that future salvation is already at work" (3:xiii). 
The experience of believers mirrors trinitarian relations in several ways. 
The same mutual love that unites Father and Son in eternity appears in 
believers. They likewise receive the gift of the Spirit from the Father and 
the Son, and when they are linked to the Son by faith and baptism, they 
become members of his body. As a result, they share in Jesus' own 
sonship and participate in the intratrinitarian life of God. Like Jesus, they 
receive the Spirit from the Father, and return it by offering prayer and 
praise (3:ll).  And they enjoy eternal life through their union with God. 
"The Spirit binds himself to the lives of his recipients so that even death 
can no longer separate their lives from his creative power" (3: 12). 
As the Spirit unites believers with God, it also unites them with each other 
and thus creates the church. And the fact that the Holy Spirit was poured out 
upon all believers identifies this community as the recipient of end-time universal 
salvation (3:13). The fellowship of the church prefigures the eschatological 
fellowship of humanity in the coming kingdom of God (3:134135). 
Pannenberg's comments on the church and the kingdom reflect classic 
Protestant positions. Jesus addressed his proclamation of God's imminent 
reign directly to individuals, he observes, and did "not attempt to gather 
together an eschatological remnant community or any other form of 
historical manifestation of the true people of God" (3:27). Therefore, 
there is a clear distinction between the church and the kingdom of God. 
The church is not the kingdom, but the "sign," "tool," or "sacrament" of 
the kingdom (3:45). The kingdom itself is an eschatological reality. It is 
the future which Christian hope anticipates. Nevertheless, it is a future 
that is already to a degree present and accessible through the church, 
"through its proclamation and its liturgical life." The Lord's Supper, in 
particular, anticipates human fellowship in the saving future of God's 
rule. Indeed, "nowhere else in the church's life does the nature of its 
whole existence as a sign find such clear expression as here" (3:31). The 
reason is the way it continues Jesus' own table fellowship, which was 
open to all members of society, particularly the poor and the outcast. 
The distinction between church and kingdom means that we can never 
identdy the kingdom with any development this side of the future 
consummation, for only then will the righteous will of God be established. It is 
not the church's task to "bridge the distinction between spiritual and secular," 
Pannenberg insiis. And liberation theology "rests on an illusion" if its advocates 
believe that revolutionary action can actualize God's kingdom (355). 
Pannenberg describes faith and love as "the basic saving works of the 
Spirit in individual Christians" (3:135). His discussion of faith recapitulates 
some of the themes for whch he is well known. Faith is not its own 
foundation. It does not guarantee the truth and reality of its contents, but 
relies instead on a basis outside itself--on God and on his revelation in the 
history of Israel and its fulfillment in Jesus. So, faith depends on the truth of 
its historical claims (3:142,153). Pannenberg knows full well the tremendous 
challenges facing such a position since the rise of the historical-critid method, 
but he is insistent. The basic claims at the heart of Christianity can be 
established by reasonable arguments, he holds (1:154). And, assurance is 
possible for believers when they place these claims, and their lives, within the 
broad context of the cosmic reality of which we are part (3:170). 
Both faith and hope have an ecstatic quality that finds fulfillment in 
love. Love unites us to God and gives us a share in his own nature. Thus, 
the love we experience is not primarily a human act, but the activity of 
the Spirit through which God reaches out in and through us. As a result, 
love for the neighbor is not something we do, but something God does 
through us. Because we participate in the divine life, the love that God is 
in his "intratrinitarian life" flows through us into the world. Thus, we 
become part of God's movement toward the "creation, reconciliation, and 
consummation" of the world" (3: 193). 
Pannenberg provides extensive essays on the sacraments and the ministry 
of the church, but none of his comments are more thought-provoking than his 
discussion of the Lord's Supper. By his account, worship is constitutive of the 
church's life, and the Lord's Supper is central to the church's worship. In fact, 
the liturgical life of the church brings to fullest expression its essential reality as 
the "eschatological community," representing the fellowship of all humankind 
in God's future reign (3:292). The Lord's Supper acquires this ~ i ~ c a n c e  
through the ministry of Jesus. When he instituted the Supper, he brought his 
disciples together in a way they had never been before. And when he ate with 
them after the resurrection, he established the Supper as the primary means for 
his followers to experience his presence all through history (3:291). 
To understand the Lord's Supper, Pannenberg maintains, we must bear in 
mind the role of table fellowship throughout Jesus' ministry. It induded his 
miraculous feeclings, the meals he ate with others, especially those marginalized 
by conventional religious standards, the feast prepared by the father of the 
prodigal son, and the banquet ~arables he used to depict the fellowship of the 
coming kingdom. In light of all this, Jesus' table fellowship points to the coming 
rule of God and underscores the mutual fellowship of all who share the meal, 
with each other and with God (3:286). Even the cry, 'Come, Lord Jesug" says 
Pannenberg, "invites Jesus to table fellowship in anticipation of God's coming 
kingdomn (3:320). This table fellowship also shows us how important the Lord's 
Supper is to our relationship with Jesus now. People who want the Lord's 
companionship muse seek it where he makes it available-at the supper which 
he instituted Jesus says, in effect, this is where I will meet you, and if you want 
my fellowship, you must accept the fellowship of those whom I welcome, and 
those whom I seek, namely, the poor and outcast (cf. 3330). 
Just as God's relation to creation culminates in the final future, 
Pannenberg's entire project culminates in its final chapter, "The 
Consummation of Creation in the Kingdom of God." Here he deals 
explicitly with the principal themes that pervade his discussion. The final 
future is not the aftermath, but the foundation, of everything that comes 
before. Everything depends on the way history ends. Until then, all that 
Christians believe is fragmentary and inconclusive. Says Pannenberg, "Only 
in the eschaton does the reconciliation of the world come to completion with 
the new life of the resurrection of the dead in the kingdom of God." And 
"only the eschatological consummation of the world will bring definitive 
proof of God's existence and final clarification of the character of his nature 
and works." Until history finally reaches its conclusion, God's love and 
wisdom-indeed, his very existence-will always be open to question (363 1). 
For this reason, "eschatology is not just the subject of a single chapter in 
dogmatics; it determines the perspective of Christian doctrine as a wholen 
(353 1). Indeed, for Pannenberg, the final future has profound epistemological 
and ontological ~ i ~ c a n c e .  "As regards its content and truth all Christian 
doctrine depends on the future of God's own coming to consummate his rule 
over creation." And, "On the path of their history in time objects and people 
exist only in anticipation of that which they will be in the light of their fina 
future, the advent of Godn (3:531). The final future is also essential to the 
meaning of every historical event. Events acquire meaning from context, the 
ultimate context of historical events is the totality of reality, and this is 
achieved only when history comes to an end. 
Pannenberg's reflections on the frnal future contain a host of intriguing 
ideas. In the work of judgment, he says, for example, God is not arbitrary; he 
does not inflict punishment capriciously, but leaves people to the consequences 
of their own choices. He executes "what is in the nature of the case" (3:611). 
Pannenberg also has valuable things to say about individual eschatology. He 
persuasively defends the concept of bodily resurrection against rival notions of 
life after death, particularly the immortality of the soul. And he helpfully points 
out that resurrection has a corporate, social dimension that is lacking from 
traditional views of immortality (3563-573). 
Perhaps most ~ i ~ c a n t ,  Pannenberg gives the final future a pneuma- 
tological character. The work of the Spirit, he says, is "constitutive" of Christ's 
return. It completes the work that began in the incarnation and the resurrection 
of Jesus. The life of the risen Lord is "wholly permeated by the Spirit and 
radiates the Spirit." The Spirit's work is fulf~lled when Christ renews his 
fellowship with believers (3:627). This future fellowship will be highly social. It 
will incorporate all the redeemed into one encompassing experience. "The new 
life of the resurrection," he says, is "a removal of the individual autonomy and 
separation that are part of the corporeality of earthly life, though with no simple 
erasure of individual particularity" (3:628-629). So, individuality will evidently 
be preserved in the final future, but without any of the tensions or rights or 
rivalry that characterize human relations now. 
But just what does this final future consist of? PannenbergYs response 
is the most paradoxical element in his thought-an event he variously 
identifies as "the coming of eternity into time," and "the dissolving of 
time in eternity" (3595, 607).12 But, however phrased, it is the idea that 
time gives way to timelessness, and temporal succession comes to an end. 
The final future is not a transition to a continuing life of temporal 
experiences, but a single, all-encompassing experience, an endpoint that 
subsumes the entire course of history that precedes it, a timeless moment 
which encompasses the entire realm of temporal passage. 
As Pannenberg describes the consummation of all things, the crucial idea 
emerges that God exists in an eternal present. The divine life is characterized 
by an "eternal simultaneity," says Pannenberg. "To God all things that were 
are always present." The ultimate destiny of creaturely existence is to 
participate in the eternity of God, and this happens when time is "taken up" 
into "the eternal simultaneity of the divine life." Only when we enter this 
simultaneity can we fulfil our destiny as individuals to belong to the whole 
of human society across all the separate epochs of history (3:607). For 
Pannenberg, eternity thus consists in "an undivided present" (3:630). This 
amplifies his description of divine eternity in volume 1. Whereas creatures are 
"subject to the march of time," "all things are always present to [God]." "The 
eternal God has no future ahead of him that is different from his present. For 
this reason, that which has been is still present to him" (1:410). In order for 
finite creatures to enjoy endless life, Pannenberg indicates, they must "pass 
through" the temporal sphere. "Only of existence in time is it true that the 
finitude of life and mortality go togethern (2:272). 
In the final future, all creatures achleve simultaneous existence in the 
eternity of God's own life. And as Pannenberg describes it, they will 
experience in one timeless moment all the events of their historical existence. 
"The ddferences of moments of time and the tenses" will be preserved, but 
they are "no longer seen apart" (3:607). This amplifies Pannenbergys earlier 
reflections on meaning and totality. As we saw, his view of historical meaning 
requires a final future, for an event acquires meaning within the whole series 
it belongs to, and a sequence of temporal events becomes a totality when it 
lZ"The relation between time and eternity is the crucial problem in eschatology," says 
Pannenberg, "and its solution has implications for all parts of Christian doctrinem( 3:595). 
comes to an end. Now we see that the final future renders history a totality 
by making all its moments simultaneous. When human beings enter eternal 
life, then, the final future which brings history to an end, they enter into 
God's own life, where they experience the full expanse of their historical 
existence in one simultaneous moment of perception. 
This unites, and completes, the trinitarian and eschatological themes that 
pervade Pannenberg's system. In the words of the final paragraph, the divine 
economy of salvation from creation to the eschatological future of salvation 
expresses "the incursion of the eternal future of God to the salvation of 
creatures." Out of eternal love, God comes forth "from the immanence of the 
divine life and incorporates the creatures into the unity of the trinitarian life." 
"The distinction and unity of the immanent and economic Trinity constitute 
the heartbeat of the divine love, and with a single such heartbeat this love 
encompasses the whole world of creatures" (3:646). 
Observations and Questions 
Pannenberg's achievement is noteworthy for many reasons. For one, 
it is proof positive that systematic theology is alive and well after a rather 
serious decline. For several decades interest in the central themes of 
historic Christianity was eclipsed by a preoccupation with methodological 
issues and the fragmentation of special perspectives. Recently, however, 
scholars have returned in impressive numbers to the task of constructing 
a comprehensive interpretation of Christian faith.13 Many of these current 
theological works have interesting things to say, but Pannenberg's 
expansive offering is in a class by itself, a "systematic theology" in the best 
sense. It is a comprehensive, constructive reflection on all the basic 
elements of Christian faith. It achieves an overarching unity, without 
slavishly following a prescription or forcing material into an artificial 
scheme. It follows the standard sequence of doctrinal topics, yet engages 
the tradition with remarkable creativity. And it shows that Pannenberg 
is versed in all the disciplines that such a task requires in today's 
world-biblical studies, philosophy, and the history of religions, as well 
as anthropology and psychology. In short, it is just the sort of work that 
every theologian dreams of producing. 
While studying Pannenberg pays rich dividends, it is also a daunting 
task. The scope, content, and style of the work present formidable 
challenges. For the most part, the translation is serviceable, but it could 
use more clarity in places, and it has produced (like the German) some 
"Rebecca S. Chopp and Gabriel Fackre surveyed the field a few years ago and found 
"a remarkable outpouringn of recent theological offerings ("Recent Works in Systematic 
Theology" Religioau Studies Review 20 [1994], 7). 
very long English sentences. The pages are so densely packed they often 
yield their meaning only after several readings. And sadly, there are very 
few "ringing sentences," statements that have you reaching for a pen to 
copy them or leave you wishing you'd said that. 
In spite of the broad scope of this work, there are times when 
Pannenberg's points need more development. For example, his explicit 
references to theodic~ are rather dismissive. He merely asserts that God 
is responsible for evil since he foresaw that it would enter the world-a 
move that leaves a host of important questions not only unanswered, 
but unacknowledged, including the relation of human freedom and 
divine foreknowledge and the relation of divine and creaturely 
responsibility. 
On a thematic level, I believe, the most noteworthy feature of the 
project is the way it draws the entire range of Christian thought into the 
framework of the Trinity. The Trinity is more than the pervasive theme 
we mentioned earlier. It is the overarching framework in which all the 
elements of Christian faith find their setting, just as every aspect of 
creation finds its ultimate destiny within God's own life. 
Over the past twenty-five years or so, Christian theologians have devoted 
considerable attention to the doctrine of the Trinity." In certain ways 
Pannenberg's project provides a culmination of this development, for it not 
only clarifies the meaning of this venerable doctrine and reasserts its current 
value, but it develops from trinitarian insights a full-fledged theological system. 
As many recent studies argue, the essential insight of the Trinity is 
that salvation history provides a portrait of God's own life, indeed the 
only portrait that should concern us.15 God's dealings with creation show, 
contrary to the dominant theological tradition, that God's innermost 
reality is complex, relational, and dynamic.16 Indeed, it is temporal.17 And 
''SO many studies have accumulated that there are now books discussing all the books 
on the topic. See, for example, John Thompson, M o h  Trinitarian Perspectives (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994)' and Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Rekztionality and 
Temporality in Divine Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1993). 
''Catherine Mowry LaCugna emphasizes this point: "The quest for knowledge of God 
or of God's ousia 'in itself' or 'by itself' is doomed to failn(Godfor Us: The Trinity and 
Christian Life [Scranton, PA: HarperCollins, 19911,193). "The very nature of God who is 
self-communicating love is expressed in what God does in the events of redemptive history. 
There is no hidden God . . . behind the God of revelation history, no possibility that God 
is in God's eternal mystery other than what God reveals Godself to be" (LaCugna, 322). Cf. 
the assertion of Robert W. Jenson: "Each of the inner-trinitarian relations is then an 
affirmation that as God works creatively among us, so he is in himself" (The Triune Identity: 
God According to the Gospel Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 19821, 107). 
16As Clark Pinnock says, "God's nature is that of a communion of three Persons who exist 
in mutual relations with one another. Each is distinct from the others, but each is what it is in 
they show that creation has intra-divine significance; it makes a difference 
to God's inner life. 
Pannenberg takes this line of thought a step further and asserts that 
God's dealings with creation not only express, but fuIf;ZZ the divine life. 
God creates out of perfect freedom, but once the world exists, he so 
commits himself to it that his own destiny, and his own identity, are 
forever linked to that of his creatures (1:447). The Son brings into 
existence a creation distinct from God out of his own eternal self- 
distinction from the Father (2:63; 6.30, 58). And through the Spirit, the 
Son brings the creatures into his own fellowship with the Father (2:32). 
The goal of creation is thus "the participation of creatures in the 
trinitarian fellowship of the Son with the Father" (2:75). The future of the 
world is nothing other than God's own future. 
Pannenberg's eschatology is both the most promising and the most 
disappointing aspect of his proposal. Given what he repeatedly says about 
the final consummation as the goal toward which creation moves and the 
significance of its proleptic arrivals in salvation history, we approach the last 
chapter of his project, which takes up explicitly eschatological themes, with 
great anticipation. We expect it to provide the culmination of all his 
reflections, much as the end of history, as he refers to it, will clarify, 
complete, and fulfil all that comes before. To the contrary, unfortunately, 
his actual discussion of last things is a disappointment. It is both less 
extensive and less clear than we hope for. 
This may be due in part to the fact that Pannenberg conceives all of 
theology as eschatology, much as Paul Tillich conceives all of theology as 
anthropology (which is why his Systematic 7 h e o Z o ~  contains no "doctrine of 
man"). And it may be due in part to the fact that eschatological language 
relation to the others. God exists in a dynamic of love, an economy of giving and receiving" 
(Flame oflove: A Theology of theHoly Spirit [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1996],30). Or, 
to quote LaCugna once again, "The point of the doctrine of the Trinity is that God's ousia exists 
only in persons who are toward another, with another, through another" (LaCugna, 193). 
Elizabeth A. Johnson makes the same point: "Trinitarian communion itself is primordial, not 
something to be added after the one God is desmbed, for there is no God who is not relational 
through and through." "For God as God, divine nature is fundamentally relational" (She Who 
Is: fie Mystery of God in Feminist TheologicalDiscourse mew York: Crossroad, 19941,227,228. 
"In Keith Ward's words, the Trinity stresses "the creative, relational, and unitive 
involvement of God in the temporal structure of the created universe" and "the importance 
of that temporal structure to the self-expression of the divine being" (Religion and Creation: 
Theoretical Approaches [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19961, 345). Robert Jenson is more 
emphatic: "The three derive from God's reality in time, from time's past/present/future. 
. . . The relations are either temporal relations or empty verbiage" (Jenson, 125-126). 
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refers to t h g s  that by nature lie "beyond human comprehension."'* But 
Pannenberg's account of last things adds little to his earlier comments about 
the end and, worse, what he does say undercuts some of the fundamental 
themes of his entire system-the importance of hstory and the dynamic 
nature of God's reality. 
The central difficulty in Pannenberg's eschatology is his recourse to 
the concept of eternity as a moment in which all time is compressed. 
God's mode of existence is an eternal present, and history reaches its final 
consummation when finite beings are incorporated and united into this 
single momentary experience. 
The difficulties with this notion of divine timelessness are numerous and 
profound. First of all, Pannenberg simply asserts eternity as the essential mode 
of God's existence, rather than arguing for it. Second, he leaves us wondering 
what a non-temporal finite existence would consist of. Temporality is inherent 
to finite existence as we know it. Indeed, it seems inherent to finite existence 
as we could possibly conceive it. So, Pannenberg's designation of the final 
future as timeless seems incoherent. Perhaps most important, the idea of a 
single eternal moment contradicts the essential insight of the Trinity, namely, 
that God's dealings with creation express and fulfd God's innermost life. If 
God's dealings with the creatures are temporal through and through, and 
God's own life is not temporal, then these dealings do not accurately portray 
God's inner reality after all. Indeed, they misrepresent God's essential nature. 
And with this, the basis of Pannenberg's proposal fractures. There are ways, 
of course, to conceive divine temporality which overcome the standard 
objections. (An impressive case can be made for a supreme instance of 
becoming.) Process thinkers and, more recently, proponents of an open view 
of God are well acquainted with them. Those who see promise in 
Pannenberg's emphasis on historical revelation and God's intimate 
involvement with temporal creatures should consult their writings, too. 
'*PannenbergYs brief appeal to the metaphorical nature of eschatological language does 
little to solve the problem. He indicates that the events do not lie in "the sphere of our 
present experience" and that our language about them is metaphorical. At the same time, he 
insists that "the matter itself is not metaphor, only the way of stating it," and that the 
concept of the kingdom of God "contains metaphorical features," but is not "totally 
metaphorical" (3:621-622). Just where metaphor ends and literal description begins, however, 
Pannenberg does not say. 
